I discuss some aspects of the epistemological distinction between laws of nature and accidental uniformities. In order that the exposition be self-contained I briefly provide a taxonomy proposed in another work for statements that appear in a scientific theory. Once this taxonomy has been presented I attempt to prove two very different types of accidental uniformities: hard and soft. The distinction is fundamental because the latter have frequently been confused with laws of nature. I try to justify why I believe (...) that these statements are accidental uniformities and not laws of nature. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v37-flichman.

In this paper I will attempt to show how incommensurability between theories is usually manifested, framing this notion in a sense similar to the Kuhnian one in certain aspects, though very different in others. Further, I will show that it is possible, and desirable, to rid Kuhn’s thesis of the idea that in many important theories a certain part of the theoretical nucleus partially contains in a more or less vague sense, synthetic a priori or even analytic statements. Alternatively, I (...) present a motive for the change of meaning in the basic terms of a theory wherein fundamental laws maintain their synthetic a posteriori character. Incommensurability in this case has to do with the change of lexicon for internal properties, independently of whether or not there is a change in the meaning of the primitive terms of the theory. (shrink)

I present one specific way of creating problematic situations: generating perplexity. A teacher with a personal history marked by a struggle to conceptualise the words of the professor or of the book, will have paved his way. The teacher develops his subject clearly. When the students say they understand, it is time to show an apparently paradoxical situation. Perplexity appears. The teacher again explains the subject and all accept again that they understand perfectly. But the difficulty doesn't disappear. The debate (...) begins. The discussion creates murmuring, noise. The perfect moment has arrived. A silent classroom would have meant the teacher's failure. Second step: "rewinding". To go back and look for the failure. The students should discover the failure, helped by the teacher. The second step finishes. Perplexities cannot always be solved, especially in the case of philosophy. When they arise from diverse proposals for a solution, it would be bad teaching to present a single way of solving the problem. Students should know that in these cases the debates are open and the discussion continues. In other cases it is just a conceptual failure in construing the corresponding notion, so the discussion should be closed once the failure is found. (shrink)

I present one specific way of creating problematic situations: generating perplexity. A teacher with a personal history marked by a struggle to conceptualise the words of the professor or of the book, will have paved his way. The teacher develops his subject clearly. When the students say they understand, it is time to show an apparently paradoxical situation. Perplexity appears. The teacher again explains the subject and all accept again that they understand perfectly. But the difficulty doesn't disappear. The debate (...) begins. The discussion creates murmuring, noise. The perfect moment has arrived. A silent classroom would have meant the teacher's failure. Second step: "rewinding". To go back and look for the failure. The students should discover the failure, helped by the teacher. The second step finishes. Perplexities cannot always be solved, especially in the case of philosophy. When they arise from diverse proposals for a solution, it would be bad teaching to present a single way of solving the problem. Students should know that in these cases the debates are open and the discussion continues. In other cases it is just a conceptual failure in construing the corresponding notion, so the discussion should be closed once the failure is found. (shrink)